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WHAT’S IN IT FOR THEM? ADVANTAGES OF HIGHER-
STATUS PARTNERS IN EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS
FABRIZIO CASTELLUCCI
Bocconi University
GOKHAN ERTUG
Singapore Management University
This article explores the motivations that high-status firms have to enter exchange
relationships with lower-status partners. We argue that high-status firms can secure
greater effort from lower-status partners and that the amount of effort will be propor-
tional to their status advantage over these partners. We further propose that such effort
will translate to increased performance by mediating the negative consequences of
affiliations with lower-status partners. This increase in performance constitutes the
motivation for high-status firms to enter exchange relationships with lower-status
partners. Findings using data on Formula One racing support our argument.
The effect that market relationships between
actors have on how third parties perceive these
actors has received considerable attention in the
field of organization studies (e.g., Podolny, 2001;
Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). In particular, re-
search on organizational status has examined
how inferences about an actor’s quality are based
not only on its past demonstration of quality, but
also on its pattern of market relationships (Gould,
2002; Podolny, 1993; Rindova, Williamson, Pet-
kova, & Sever, 2006). This stream of research has
shown that high-status firms enjoy cost advan-
tages over those of lower status (Podolny, 1993),
as well as lower monetary compensation to em-
ployees (Frank, 1985). Cost advantages are not
the sole benefit of high status, however. High-
status firms grow faster (Podolny, Stuart, & Han-
nan, 1996), have greater access to capital (Stuart
et al., 1999), can charge higher prices for their
products (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999), enter more
easily into related new markets (Jensen, 2003),
face less retaliation by incumbents (Podolny &
Morton, 1999), and enjoy privileges of status in-
dependent of their performance (Washington &
Zajac, 2005).
If market relationships are a signal of status,
high-status firms may not be able to affiliate with
low-status firms without risking a decline in their
own status, and consequently, losing some of
their advantages (Podolny, 1993). Inasmuch as a
firm’s status is influenced by the status of its
affiliates (Podolny & Phillips, 1996), high-status
firms become more exclusive in the formation of
exchange relationships, thereby affiliating with
firms of similar status (Chung, Singh, & Lee,
2000; Li & Berta, 2002; Podolny, 1994). Although
this line of thought clearly predicts status “ho-
mophily” in exchange relationships, both anec-
dotal and empirical evidence suggests that “het-
erophilous” status relationships—relationships
between firms of different status—do exist (see,
e.g., Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Li
& Rowley 2002; Stuart, 2000). What is lacking is
a clear explanation of why high-status firms af-
filiate with low-status ones. In this article, we fill
this theoretical gap by directly examining the
motivations that high-status firms have for enter-
ing exchange relationships with low-status
actors.
The starting point of our argument is that a
firm’s quality and its status are related (e.g., Ben-
jamin & Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993; Washing-
ton & Zajac, 2005). In their study of status dy-
namics, Podolny and Phillips (1996) showed that
the growth in a firm’s status is partly a function of
the status of the firm’s affiliates and partly a
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function of the firm’s past demonstration of qual-
ity. If quality does indeed have an effect on sta-
tus, given that a firm’s quality depends on the
material benefits it can or cannot secure in its
relationships with others, we can derive motiva-
tions for high-status firms to affiliate with
lower-status ones.
Building on the idea that firms are willing to
provide effort in exchange for status, we propose
that higher-status firms can secure greater effort
in exchange relationships with lower-status
counterparts. The greater effort obtained, when a
situation demands it, will be proportional to the
status advantage of the higher-status firm over
the lower-status partner. To the extent that
greater effort increases the quality of a focal
firm’s products, the motivation of a high-status
firm to enter relationships with lower-status part-
ners lies in the increased product quality result-
ing from such relationships. Using data on the
relationships between race teams and engine sup-
pliers in Formula One racing between 1993 and
1999, we find support for our argument that high-
status teams obtain greater effort by affiliating
with lower-status engine suppliers than they
would obtain from affiliating with engine suppli-
ers of similar status. In addition, we find that this
greater effort has a positive effect on the race
teams’ performance and that this effect mediates
the negative consequences of affiliations with
lower-status partners.
THEORY
When deciding to enter an exchange relation-
ship, firms are faced with a series of potential
partners whose products’ quality is often difficult
to ascertain (Podolny, 1993, 1994). It is not until
an exchange takes place that a firm can clearly
observe the true quality of the chosen partner.
Arguably, this problem is even more relevant
when the exchange involves the acquisition of
inputs for a firm’s own production. Insofar as the
quality of inputs affects the quality of a firm’s
final products (Barney, 1991; Moran & Ghoshal,
1999), the firm needs to reduce the uncertainty
regarding the quality of potential exchange part-
ners before entering into an exchange. To reduce
such uncertainty, firms use the status of potential
partners as a cue for determining the underlying
quality of their products (Podolny, 1993, 1994).
Status has been defined as the perceived qual-
ity of the products of a producer relative to either
the products of similar others or its competitors
(Podolny, 1993), and it is generally considered as
a signal used by relevant audiences to reduce the
uncertainty surrounding the quality of the pro-
ducer’s products (e.g., Podolny & Stuart, 1995).
Relevant audiences develop a status hierarchy of
firms—that is, a perception of the relative quality
of firms’ products—by observing both the quality
that firms have demonstrated in the past and the
status of their affiliates (Podolny, 2005: 13, 18;
Podolny & Phillips, 1996; Rindova, Williamson,
Petkova, & Sever, 2006). Since status is defined as
the perceived quality of a producer’s products in
relation to its competitors’, and since patterns of
affiliation are more readily observable than un-
derlying quality itself, yet are assumed to be cor-
related with quality (Podolny, 1994), firms’ pat-
terns of relationships convey status (Stuart,
2000). For instance, affiliations with high-status
firms can work in the eyes of audiences as en-
dorsements of the quality of a producer, transfer-
ring de facto status to the lower-status partner. In
general, relationships with predominantly high-
status actors lead to an increase in one’s own
status, and relationships with predominantly
low-status actors lead to a reduction in one’s own
status (Podolny & Phillips, 1996).
Research investigating the effects of status in
exchange relationships has mostly focused on
firms’ patterns of affiliations and the status trans-
fers they engender to explain firms’ motivations
to affiliate. As high status begets benefits, high-
status firms have incentives to protect their po-
sitions in a status hierarchy; they thereby strive
to affiliate with firms of similar status. This ten-
dency creates status homophily, wherein firms
affiliate with others of similar status, especially
as market uncertainty increases (Podolny, 1994).
However, to understand the motivation that high-
status firms might have to affiliate with lower-
status partners, one needs to consider that ex-
change relationships affect firms not only
through the implicit status transfer they engen-
der, but also through the explicit exchange di-
mensions of such affiliations. Inasmuch as the
quality of the resources exchanged in a relation-
ship affect the quality of a firm’s products, the
overall effect, and thus, the desirability, of an
exchange relationship should be evaluated in
terms of both the transfer of status and the quality
of the resources exchanged.
The basic premise of status-based models of
markets is that some level of uncertainty exists
regarding the quality of a producer’s products
(Podolny, 2001). As a result, high-status firms
have enhanced access to exchange partners be-
cause, ceteris paribus, others prefer to enter ex-
change relationships with high-status actors
rather than low-status ones. Having a greater pool
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of potential partners to select from, high-status
firms should be better able than low-status firms
to secure partnerships with high-quality others.
However, given the uncertainty as to the quality
of products, it is not until an exchange takes
place that a firm can assess the actual quality of a
partner. In addition, given the loose linkage be-
tween status and quality (Podolny, 1993), affili-
ating only with firms of equal status might not
guarantee that high-status firms always obtain
the desired high quality from their partners. For
these reasons, the quality of the product of an
exchange partner is not the sole relevant explicit
dimension of an exchange. The ability and will-
ingness of the exchange partner to expend re-
sources and act to solve quality issues might also
be relevant to the material exchange. For in-
stance, when deciding to outsource an informa-
tion technology system, a company might be in-
terested not only in the quality and reliability of
the system, but also in the provider’s response
time when a problem occurs. Arguably, the
higher the quality of the sourced goods, the fewer
the failures that will occur, and consequently the
less effort that is required from the exchange
partner. Yet failure may still occur with high-
quality products. For this reason, the effort an
exchange partner expends in response to the
needs and demands of a focal firm constitutes
another relevant explicit dimension of exchange
relationships. In this study, we define effort as
the determined attempt a firm makes to expend
time and resources to address problems related to
the products that an exchange partner has ob-
tained from the firm. This definition is consistent
with prior studies’ definition of effort as the time
and resources a firm devotes to solving exchange
partners’ problems (McEvily & Marcus, 2005) or
to fostering collaboration in firms’ alliances (Park
& Ungson, 1997; White & Lui, 2005).
Hsu (2004) showed that entrepreneurial start-
ups are both more likely to accept offers by rep-
utable venture capitalists (defined as those with
more network resources, funds, and industry ex-
perience than other venture capitalists have) and
also to accept these offers at a discount on their
valuation. These findings suggest that actors with
good reputations are well positioned to extract
benefits from their exchange partners. Along the
same lines, high-status firms should be better
positioned than low-status firms to choose those
partners that will provide greater effort. Since a
larger number of exchange partners are willing to
work with high-status firms than with low-status
ones, those that have secured affiliations to high-
status firms are likely to work hard to maintain
their relationships.
As mentioned earlier, effort is especially cru-
cial when a situation demands it—that is, when
quality problems arise. Once an exchange rela-
tionship is established, a firm may discover that
the quality of its partner’s products is less than
satisfactory. In such a case, effort from the ex-
change partner can become essential to reach, or
re-establish, the desired level of quality. Thus,
we would not only expect effort and attention to
become relevant when quality is less than satis-
factory, but we would also expect it to be primar-
ily at these times that differences in effort can be
observed. In sum, the greater effort obtained by
high-status firms should be manifest when the
quality of the exchanged good is not of the de-
sired level. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1. In an exchange relationship, a
high-status firm secures greater effort from
its partner than a low-status firm does when
the exchanged product reveals quality
problems.
The previous line of argument is based on the
idea that the effort a firm can obtain from its
exchange partners is determined solely by its
own status. We argue, however, that the amount
of effort depends not only on a firm’s status, but
also on its status advantage over its partners. In
order to increase its status, a lower-status actor
will be willing to expend greater effort in return
for the status increase that a relationship with a
higher-status partner entails. As the status differ-
ence between the two actors in a relationship
increases, the lower-status actor will be more will-
ing to expend effort to cater to the needs and de-
mands of the higher-status partner. This is because
the lower-status actor has more status to gain as the
status of its exchange partner increases (Podolny &
Phillips, 1996). In explaining firms’ propensities to
collaborate, Stuart speculated that in order to gain
the certification advantages of alliances with pres-
tigious enterprises, low-prestige firms are “likely to
need to proffer generous financial terms and/or ac-
cess to promising development-stage technologies
to entice a high-status firm into an exchange rela-
tion” (1998: 675). Similarly, we argue that low-
status firms are likely to offer greater effort to entice
high-status firms into an exchange relationship.
This line of thought is consistent with the idea
that status brings power to those who possess it.
Using an experimental design, Thye (2000) in-
deed showed that high-status actors have a power
advantage over their low-status partners. Build-
ing on Schelling (1956), Inkpen and Beamish
2010 151Castellucci and Ertug
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(1997) showed that the instability of interna-
tional joint ventures depends on shifts in bar-
gaining power between the partners. The under-
lying assumption is that the bargaining power of
each party in an interfirm relationship is based
on its control of key resources. Since status is
heterogeneously distributed among firms, cannot
be easily imitated, and can be partially controlled
by firms, it can be considered a valuable resource
(Barney, 1991). High-status firms control access
to status by choosing whether to continue or ter-
minate a relationship or by choosing to affiliate
again with the same firm in the future. The
greater the status difference between the two
partners, the more the higher-status actor is con-
tributing an important resource to the relation-
ship for the lower-status partner to appropriate,
and consequently the more the power balance
shifts in favor of the higher-status partner. This
creates dependence for the lower-status partner,
thereby allowing the higher-status partner to ex-
tract better conditions in the relationship. Thus,
we predict that the greater the status difference
between the partners in a relationship, the better
positioned the higher-status partner is to secure
greater effort. The greater the advantages related
to the implicit transfer of status that accrue to the
lower-status partner, the more willing it is to
offer greater effort to the higher-status partner. As
discussed earlier, greater effort is needed, and is
therefore observable, when the quality of the ex-
changed product is less than satisfactory. Thus,
Hypothesis 2. In an exchange relationship, as
the status difference between two partners
increases, the lower-status partner provides
greater effort when the product exchanged
reveals quality problems.
Actors who want to increase their status need
to establish relationships with actors that have
higher status than they have themselves. How-
ever, higher-status actors face a reduction in sta-
tus and its related benefits by affiliating with
lower-status ones. Hypothesis 2 states that the
lower-status actor in a relationship assures and
delivers greater effort to compensate for this pos-
sible reduction. In this way, higher-status actors
derive immediate benefits related to the explicit
dimensions of exchanges, and lower-status actors
derive higher status, via the implicit dimension
whose benefits are diffused over time. Con-
versely, lower-status actors incur immediate ex-
penditure in the relationship, while higher-status
firms risk longer-term status reduction, possibly
starting a vicious cycle wherein such reduction
will decrease both market-level returns to status
and the effort from their partners. If this is the
case, why do high-status firms enter relation-
ships with lower-status partners? Will greater ef-
fort translate into benefits for the higher-status
partner?
Ceteris paribus, firms working with high-qual-
ity components, or building on high-quality in-
puts, are likelier to produce high-quality prod-
ucts than firms using low-quality inputs (Barney,
1991; Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). Similarly, to the
extent that effort from exchange partners has an
effect on the quality of products, a firm that is
able to secure greater effort from its exchange
partners can produce better-quality products
than a firm that is unable to secure the same level
of effort from its partners. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship
between an exchange partner’s effort and a
firm’s product quality.
This link to product quality points to the mo-
tivations that a firm might have to enter exchange
relationships with lower-status partners. To the
extent that effort increases product quality, firms
have motivations to enter exchange relationships
with lower-status partners, because, all else being
equal, these relationships will result in the pro-
duction of higher-quality products than relation-
ships with partners of similar status.
Although our discussion has emphasized the
advantages of forming relationships with lower-
status partners, we should not overlook the po-
tential disadvantages of such relationships. For
status to maintain its function as a signal of qual-
ity (Spence, 1973), status and quality should be
positively correlated (Podolny, 1993). This rela-
tionship implies that low-status firms tend to
produce goods of lower quality compared to
high-status firms. All else being equal, sourcing
products from a lower-status partner is likely to
have a negative effect on the quality of a firm’s
own products. However, working with a lower-
status partner grants a firm a more powerful po-
sition in securing effort when quality issues arise.
Insofar as effort from exchange partners has an
effect on the quality of a focal firm’s products, a
firm that is able to secure greater effort from its
exchange partners should produce better-quality
products. If on the one hand working with lower-
status partners leads to reduced product quality,
on the other hand the increased effort and atten-
tion obtained from the lower-status partners mit-
igates such reduction. Therefore,
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Hypothesis 4. Effort mediates the effect of af-
filiating with lower-status partners on product
quality.
FORMULA ONE RACING
The empirical context we used to test our hy-
potheses was Formula One (F1) racing. Our focus
was the relationship between an F1 team, as a
firm in this industry is customarily called, and its
engine supplier.1 Given the frequent changes in
the regulations imposed by the F1 governing
body—the Fe´de´ration Internationale de l’Auto-
mobile (FIA)—we focused on a period with rela-
tively stable regulations, the racing seasons from
1993 to 1999.
Since the first official Formula One grand prix
held in 1950, the F1 series has been considered
the pinnacle of automotive technology. In this
series, F1 teams, or “constructors,” as the FIA
officially defines them, compete for the Construc-
tor’s Championship, which is awarded to the
team that scores the highest number of champi-
onship points during a season. Drivers compete
for the Driver’s Championship, awarded to the
driver scoring the most championship points.
Each team enters every race with two cars, and
the points a car scores in each race are awarded to
both the team and the driver.
To be eligible to race, a team needs to manu-
facture at least the chassis of its cars, whereas it
can buy the other components from external sup-
pliers. Usually, a team buys its engines from an
external supplier. The engine is a key element not
only because it is a structural component of the
car, but also because, in conjunction with the
chassis, it determines the weight, the speed, the
handling, and ultimately the performance of the
car.2
Several features of F1 make it well suited to
testing our hypotheses. First, there is a reasonably
straightforward way to conceptualize status inde-
pendently of performance in this context, even
though the link between them might be stronger
than in other contexts. Given that performance is
clear and easy to observe, status differences may
originally arise in part from performance differ-
ences. However, once status differences are mani-
fest, there is inertia in the status ordering. Perfor-
mance is unambiguous at the end of each race and
season. Yet, given the differences in racetracks, the
inherent complexity of cars, and the substantial
redesign of cars between seasons, it is uncertain
how competition will unfold in the future.3 As a
result, when deciding to affiliate with a team, sup-
pliers, drivers, and sponsors rely not only on the
team’s past performance, but also on some percep-
tion of quality, which can be even more important
than performance. For instance, in 1992 Ayrton
Senna announced his desire to drive for the Ferrari
team by stating, “A real champion can’t finish his
career without having driven a car fromMaranello”
(Chiavegato, 1992). (Maranello is where Ferrari cars
are manufactured.) Having won three Driver Cham-
pionships between 1988 and 1991, Senna was per-
haps the most highly regarded driver in F1 at that
time. On the other hand, Ferrari was a struggling
team that had not won a Driver’s Championship for
over 14 years. In 1992, when Senna made his desire
public, Ferrari had scored only 21 constructor’s
points, as opposed to the 164 scored by Williams
(the winning constructor) and the 99 scored by
McLaren (Senna’s team).
Second, both an explicit transfer of resources and
an implicit transfer of status occur between an F1
team and its engine supplier. Customarily, promi-
nent teams obtain top-specification engines for free
in exchange for the prestige of working with them
(Spurgeon, 1997). This prestige then translates into
the suppliers’ increased ability to sell their engines
to less prestigious teams that have to buy them on1 F1 racing teams were middle-sized firms averaging
164 employees and $34.5 million in assets in 1997. In
addition to their racing departments, these firms have
R&D, marketing, manufacturing, and testing depart-
ments. Engine suppliers are also middle-sized firms
specializing in the design and manufacture of race
engines. In addition to independent firms, some engine
suppliers are controlled by larger car manufacturers;
for instance, Cosworth is owned by Ford. Engine sup-
pliers typically work with an average of two teams per
season, ranging from one to four teams.
2 An F1 car has about 3,500 elements that need to be
specifically designed to fit together with the utmost
precision. In addition to the engine, these elements are
assembled to create subsystems, such as chassis with
aerodynamic appendices, hydraulics, cooling, trans-
mission with gearbox, suspensions, electronics, and
brakes.
3 In our sample the correlation between the points
scored by a car in two consecutive races is .41 (p  .001)
suggesting high uncertainty between races. The correla-
tion between the points scored by a team in two consec-
utive seasons from 1950 to 1999 is .77 (p .001). Though
it seems to indicate a low level of uncertainty, it is worth
noting that this correlation goes from a maximum of .98
in 1993 to a minimum of .04 in 1971, with a standard
deviation of .22. This variation shows uncertainty in the
extent to which current performance will translate into
future performance.
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regular commercial terms. These supply contracts,
which are usually signed at the beginning of a
racing season, determine the cost of the transac-
tions; thus, the engine suppliers will pay for any
subsequent changes in the engines.
Although only the first three positions in an F1
race receive awards in a televised ceremony, cars
finishing in the first six positions receive champi-
onship points (10 for first, 6 for second, 4 for third,
3 for fourth, 2 for fifth, and 1 for sixth). One event
that clearly damages a team is not finishing a race.
As five-time champion driver Juan Manuel Fangio
used to say, “To finish first, first you have to fin-
ish,” meaning that a reliable car is necessary to
perform well in a race. Teams that have to retire
from a race not only do not score any points, but
also lose valuable television time and exposure for
their sponsors. Among the different reasons for a
car to be retired from a race, which include a bro-
ken suspension, failed hydraulics, and spin-off or
crash, engine problems are the most frequent. In
our sample, 42 percent of the cars had had to retire
from a race, and 21 percent of these retirements
were due to engine problems. Thus, engines are key
to performance not only because they allow a car to
go fast, but also because, more often than any other
cause, their malfunctioning forces leaving a race.
Thus, it is possible to observe the quality, or lack
thereof, of a team’s engine supplier by measur-
ing the number of the team’s engine-related
retirements.
Teams would like their engine suppliers to take
quick action to solve engine problems that resulted
in retirement from a race. Usually these problems
are addressed through two remedial actions: mod-
ifying current engine designs and introducing new
designs. Therefore, it is possible to observe the
timing and amount of engine suppliers’ effort by
studying the remedial actions they take in response
to engine failures.
Although our hypotheses do not discriminate be-
tween the two sides of a relationship, in our empir-
ical setting we focused on race teams, predicting
the effects that status and status advantage have in
how much effort they secure from their engine sup-
pliers. The hypotheses can be translated into our
empirical context as follows: Hypothesis 1 states
that high-status teams are more likely to secure
engine modifications and redesigns than low-status
teams as the number of engine failures increases.
Hypothesis 2, however, states that such likelihood
is proportional to the status differential between a
team and its engine supplier. Hypothesis 3 states
that the number of modifications/redesigns in-
creases race team performance. Finally, Hypothesis
4 states that the number of engine modifications/
redesigns mediates the effect on performance of a
status differential between a team and its engine
supplier.
METHODS
We used data on Formula One racing covering
the years from 1993 to 1999. Standings, car speci-
fications, and causes for cars’ retirement from each
race were obtained from the annual publication
Autocourse. Financial information was collected
from the database Amadeus. The remaining data
were obtained from the annual publication Who
Works in Formula One.
Modeling Strategy
To test our hypotheses, we estimated two sets of
models (engine modifications/redesigns and prod-
uct quality) using the statistical package Stata 10.
The first set uses event history techniques (Tuma &
Hannan, 1984) to estimate the hazard rate of engine
modification/redesign. Given that engine modifica-
tions/redesigns are ordered, repeated events, we
modeled the event histories as conditional risk set
models (Prentice, Williams, & Peterson, 1981). The
assumption underlying these models is that a sub-
ject is at risk at time t of experiencing event k only
if it has experienced event k  1 by time t. For
instance, the conditional risk set of teams experi-
encing a second modification/redesign at time t is
composed of all teams at time t that had already
experienced a first modification/redesign. Each ob-
servation is a team, and its duration extends from
the beginning of each racing season to the event
(modification/redesign) or the data-censoring time
(end of the racing season). Each observation was
split at race dates to allow for time varying covari-
ates. We used a piecewise exponential specifica-
tion with baseline rates assumed to be constant
within time periods (but able to vary over time),
and covariates assumed to have the same effect
over time. We tried different constant “time-
pieces”: for each year, for six races, or for four
races; all yielded consistent results. Thus, we re-
port results with yearly time-pieces.
The second set of models, which predicts teams’
product quality, was estimated using partial adjust-
ment models (Coleman, 1968; Tuma & Hannan,
1984). As they explicitly estimate rate of change,
partial adjustment models have been used to ana-
lyze gradually changing variables such as organiza-
tional structure (Freeman & Hannan, 1975; Strang,
1987), performance (Greve, 1999), and sales
(Boeker, 1991). The assumption underlying these
models is that the dependent variable is not in
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equilibrium but tends toward it. In this model,
change in quality is specified as
dQt/dt  r(Q*  Qt), (1)
where r is the rate of adjustment toward the target,
Qt is product quality at time t, and Q* is target
product quality, which is not observed but can be
modeled as a function of observable variables
(Tuma & Hannan, 1984). In our case, target product
quality is modeled as
Q*    Xt, (2)
where  is a constant value and Xt are covariates
describing an F1 team, its engine supplier and driv-
ers, and the exchange relationship. The partial ad-
justment model can be estimated by substituting
Equation 2 into Equation 1 and solving for Qt to
obtain
Qt  t  ertQt  (1  ert)(  Xt). (3)
We follow the approach proposed by Strang (1987)
and followed by Greve (1999) of directly estimating
Equation 3 by nonlinear least squares. In this data
set, it seems reasonable to consider the time be-
tween the end of racing seasons as constant. In such
a case, the equation can be further simplified by
substituting   ert to give
Qt  1  Qt  (1  )(  Xt). (4)
This equation, which is nonlinear in the parameter
, was estimated with the nonlinear iterative least-
squares estimation routines provided by Stata 10.
Dependent Variables
Engine modification/redesign. The explicit di-
mension of the exchange relationship we studied
manifests itself in the actions of an engine supplier
to resolve engine problems that have led to a car’s
retirement from a race. Engine suppliers address
these problems by introducing either a modifica-
tion to the existing engine design or a redesigned
engine. Though these actions have different costs
for the engine supplier—arguably, redesigning an
engine is more costly than modifying it—they both
require substantial effort from the supplier. We col-
lapsed the two events, considering the occurrence
of either as a relevant remedial action, and created
a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if in a
given race a team had at least one car with a mod-
ified/redesigned engine and 0 otherwise. The time
of the event is the date of the race. In our sample,
there were 23 modifications and 36 redesigns, for a
total of 59 remedial actions.
Product quality.We measured the product qual-
ity of an F1 racing team as the total points it had
earned in the constructor championship at the end
of each season. This is the sum of the points earned
in each race of a season by a team’s two cars.
Independent Variables
Team status. One of the manifestations of status,
dubbed the “Matthew effect” by Merton (1968), is
that high-status actors receive greater rewards for
any given level of quality or performance. One of
the rewards that high-status F1 teams receive is
considerable media attention for a given level of
performance. Podolny (1993) observed this phe-
nomenon in investment banking; even if a low-
status bank is performing well, it is not likely to
receive the attention from the press that a higher-
status bank receives. Accordingly, we measured the
status of teams using a residualized measure of
press mentions. We searched Lexis-Nexis for yearly
article counts for race teams, running separate
searches counting the numbers of articles in which
the name of a team appeared in the text and in
which either the heading or the leading paragraph
contained the term “Formula One.”4 Status was
then measured by the residuals obtained by regress-
ing press mentions on the total points scored by a
team for each yearly cross-section.5 To avoid issues
of causality, we lagged status by a year when it was
included in models. The residuals were also stan-
dardized by year to have a mean equal to 5 and a
standard deviation equal to 1. In our data, the cor-
relation between status in two consecutive years
was .52 (p  .001), suggesting that status is persis-
tent even in a context such as Formula One, where
performance is easily observable.
Our measure of status did not directly measure
deference (e.g., Benjamin & Podolny, 1999;
Podolny, 1993) or historical legacy (e.g., Washing-
4 One could argue that this count does not take into
account whether an article refers positively or negatively
to a team. Research on reputation (Rhee & Haunschild,
2006) and status (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001) has suggested
that readers pay more attention to and journalists report
more often on prominent targets or events, regardless of
the valence of the news. Thus, high-status teams should
be mentioned in more articles for both positive and neg-
ative events.
5 We checked the deviations from the regressed line by
visual inspection and by testing for heteroskedasticity of
the residuals with the Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg
tests. Only the cross-sections for the years 1991, 1994,
and 1995 show higher variance for high-performing
teams.
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ton & Zajac, 2005), but instead relied on a manifes-
tation of deference or legacy. Therefore, we
checked whether our measure captured perceptual
differences among well-informed respondents. In
July 2000, we randomly sampled 50 experts from
the list of 246 journalists/photographers repre-
sented in the 1999 edition of Who Works in For-
mula One, asking them to rate the status of teams
on a 1–7 scale. Seventeen responses from experts of
eight nationalities were returned for a response rate
of 34 percent. A principal component factor analy-
sis indicated strong consensus among the raters,
with a single factor loading between .82 and .96 for
each expert. The correlation between the factor
score and the residualized status measure was .22
(p  .05). As status is partially a consequence of
performance, the perceptual measure of status
might be partially driven by teams’ recent perfor-
mance. Therefore,we obtained a better validation of
our residualized measure with a partial correlation
between the perceptual and the residualized mea-
sures for year 1998, the last year of the residualized
status scores, controlling for team performance in
the same year. A partial correlation of .74 (p  .05)
suggested the validity of the residualized press
mentions as a measure of status.6
To investigate additional behavioral differences
in status and see the extent to which our measure
captured them, we also looked at sponsorship deals
involving F1 teams. The assumption was that, for
any level of performance, high-status teams would
have greater access to sponsorship money than
low-status teams. We used the World Sponsorship
Monitor database, which covers F1 sponsorship
deals from September 1997 onwards, selecting only
those deals in which sponsorship was directed to a
team. Since the last year of observation for our
measure of status was 1998, we added for each
team the value in dollars of the deals completed
between the end of the 1997 season and the end of
the 1998 season. This calculation provided us with
43 deals for ten teams, with an average sponsorship
deal value of $6.1 million. The correlation between
these values and the residualized measure of status
for 1998 was .72 (p  .05). Considering that high-
status teams should have greater access to re-
sources for any given level of performance than
low-status teams, we calculated the partial correla-
tion between our residualized measure of status
and the total dollar value of sponsorships for 1998,
controlling for team performance. A value of .76
(p  .05) confirmed the validity of our residualized
measure of status.
A final validation of our status measure was ob-
tained by studying deferential behavior in F1 per-
sonnel. To construct this measure, we coded the
movements of personnel (drivers, technical direc-
tors, designers, race engineers, and chief mechan-
ics) who left a team in 1998 to join a more poorly
performing team in 1999. The assumption is that F1
personnel would join a poorer performer only if
they could compensate for this loss in performance
by a gain in status or a higher salary. We con-
structed a relational matrix R in which each cell rij
was the number of personnel who left team i in
1998 to join team j in 1999. We computed the
measure of status for relational data using Bonac-
ich’s (1987) c(, ) with  set at three-quarters of
the highest eigenvalue (e.g., Podolny, 1993). We
then calculated the partial correlation between this
measure and the residualized measure of status,
controlling for firm size, as larger firms might offer
higher salaries. The partial correlation of .71 (p 
.01) confirmed the validity of our residualized mea-
sure of status.
Status difference. We measured the status dif-
ference between a race team and its engine supplier
by subtracting the status of the engine supplier
from the status of the race team. We measured the
status of an engine supplier for a current racing
season as the average status of all the race teams the
engine supplier supplied during the previous rac-
ing season.7 To make engine supplier status com-
parable to team status, we normalized it by year to
6 One might reasonably ask why we did not use the
expert scores as a measure of status. First, and most
importantly, our measure of expert scores occurred at
only one time point; accordingly, we could not control as
easily for unobserved differences among teams by focus-
ing on within-team variance. Second, given that our
other data were drawn from the 1990s, the perceptual
measure of status from 2000 might be a consequence of
performance outcomes throughout the 1990s rather than
an indicator of a cause of those outcomes. One might also
ask why we did not use raw press mentions as a measure
of status, given that they were a behavioral measure and
correlated at .75 with the expert scores. The main reason
was that these raw press mentions were not independent
of performance. Therefore, we could have given the im-
pression that some teams had high status only because
they were performing particularly well in that season.
7 The issue of how each affiliate contributes to one’s
status through transfer “rests on one’s theory about how
the underlying social processes operate” (Stuart et al.,
1999: 330). Engine suppliers’ status might derive from
either the highest or the average status of all affiliate
teams. Our engine status measure, i.e., the average status,
correlates .93 (p  .001) with the highest status. The
findings remain unchanged if we use highest status in the
analyses.
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have a mean equal to 5 and a standard deviation
equal to 1. A correlation of .31 (p  .01) between
team status and engine supplier status suggested
the existence of heterophilous race team–engine
supplier pairs in our sample.8
We argued, in Hypothesis 2, that the status ad-
vantage a firm has over its partner increases the
effort of the lower-status partner in the relation-
ship. Given that in our context we could observe
only the effort of the engine supplier, we expected
that when the status difference was in favor of the
race team, the difference would be positively re-
lated to a higher likelihood of engine modification/
redesign. Conversely, when the engine supplier
had higher status than the race team, we expected a
lower likelihood of engine modification/redesign.
Rather than assuming a symmetrical effect for both
team status advantage and team status disadvan-
tage, we used a spline specification by splitting
status difference in two. Team status advantage
equaled 0 when team status was lower than engine
supplier status and equaled the status difference
when team status was higher than engine supplier
status. Conversely, team status disadvantage
equaled 0 when team status was higher than engine
supplier status and equaled status difference when
team status was lower than engine supplier status.
For ease of interpretation, we reverse-coded this
last variable.
Supplier effort. To test Hypothesis 3, we esti-
mated the effects that supplier effort had on a
team’s product quality. We measured effort as the
total number of engine modifications/redesigns a
supplier had provided to a team during a season.
Control Variables for Engine
Modification/Redesign
We included two different sets of control vari-
ables, one for each set of models. These variables
relate to a focal F1 team and engine supplier, their
relationship, drivers, and race. We also controlled
for sample selection bias in models predicting en-
gine modification/redesign.
F1 team level. Two variables captured a team’s
past and present performance. Team past perfor-
mance was the sum of points a team earned in the
previous racing season, divided by 10, and team
current performance was the sum of points scored
by the team in a current season, up to the previous
race. We controlled for team size, measured as as-
sets in millions of U.S. dollars, and team age, in
years, divided by 10. We included team perfor-
mance, previous race, measured as the sum of
points scored by a team in the previous race, as a
team performing well in its previous race might not
risk changing the engine. We also included current
engine failures, measured as the number of engine
failures a team had experienced in the current rac-
ing season up to the present race. This variable not
only controlled for current engine quality, but also
tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 when interacted with the
status variables.
Engine supplier level.More established and bet-
ter-performing engine suppliers might be more at-
tentive to the needs and demands of the teams they
supply. We included engine supplier agemeasured
in years and divided by 10, and engine supplier
past performance, measured as the average of the
points earned by all the teams supplied in a previ-
ous racing season, divided by 10. We included
modification/redesign, current number, the count
of redesigns and modifications in the current racing
season up to the present race, to control for a sup-
plier’s tendency to introduce redesigned/modified
engines. Because it is highly unlikely an engine
supplier will introduce a modification/redesign in
two consecutive races, we also included a dummy
variable called modification/redesign, previous
race, coded 1 if there was a modification or rede-
sign in a previous race, and 0 otherwise.
Relationship level. To control for the embedded-
ness of a relationship, we included two variables,
engine duration and partnership. The former mea-
sured the duration of the relationship between a
team and an engine supplier as the log transforma-
tion of the number of days elapsed since the start of
their relationship. Sometimes teams and engine
suppliers establish partnerships in which a sup-
plier develops or provides top-specification en-
gines for one or more race teams. To control for this
relationship, we included a binary variable called
partnership, coded 1 when Who Works in Formula
One reported the existence of a partnership and 0
otherwise. To control for the exclusivity of a team-
supplier relationship, we included number of
teams supplied,measured as the number of teams a
8 An alternative measure of engine supplier status was
obtained by using a residualized measure of press men-
tions. We used Lexis-Nexis to search for yearly article
counts where the name of each engine supplier appeared
in the text, and where “Formula One” appeared in either
the heading or the leading paragraph of an article. Status
was measured by the residuals obtained by regressing
press mentions on the average points scored in the Con-
structor’s Championship by the teams supplied by the
engine supplier for each yearly cross-section. We stan-
dardized this measure and computed status differences
using this alternative measure. All models run using this
alternative measure led to results that were similar to,
albeit weaker than (p  .10), those reported here.
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supplier worked with during a current racing sea-
son. The fewer teams an engine supplier works
with, the more resources it can allocate to a given
team and the more it will have to gain or lose from
the outcomes of each affiliation.
Driver level. Teams whose drivers are better
performing and more experienced than other
teams’ drivers might secure greater effort from
engine suppliers than the other teams secure. We
controlled for driver past performance, measured
as the points earned by a driver in the previous
season and divided by 10. Driver experience was
measured as the number of F1 races a driver had
taken part in since s/he started racing in F1. To
control for the experience of a driver with the
current F1 team, we included driver duration,
measured as the log transformation of the number
of days driven for the current team.
Race characteristics. We also controlled for
race characteristics possibly related to the intro-
duction of a modified or redesigned engine. First,
we controlled for track length, in kilometers. Sec-
ond, we included season clock, the number of
days elapsed since the start of a racing season,
divided by 10, to account for the possibility that
an engine supplier might be more prone to un-
dertaking modifications or redesigns early or late
in a season.
Sample selection. Lastly, we controlled for the
possibility of sample selection bias in our esti-
mating engine modifications/redesigns. The sam-
ple selection problem emerged because the like-
lihood of requiring a modification/redesign of an
engine might depend on the quality of the engine
itself. In other words, team–engine supplier pairs
might have different likelihoods of engine fail-
ure, therefore requiring different levels of effort.
To address this problem, we used Lee’s (1983)
generalization of Heckman’s (1979) two-stage
sample selection estimation. We estimated the
hazard rate at which a team was likely to experi-
ence an engine failure and included this variable,
hazard rate of engine failure, in the estimation of
modification/redesign (Barnett, Greve, & Park,
1994). The Appendix provides a description of
the hazard model of engine failures.
Control Variables for Product Quality
In this set of models, we predicted teams’ prod-
uct quality at the end of each racing season. We
used year-level variables in estimating these
models.
F1 team level. We controlled for team past
performance as well as team size and team age.
More established or larger teams might secure
more opportunities to improve their perfor-
mance. By influencing a team’s status, status
transfer is also likely to affect performance. Thus,
we controlled for team status, team status advan-
tage, and team status disadvantage.
Engine supplier level. We controlled for en-
gine supplier age and engine supplier past per-
formance. Race teams that work with very well-
established and high-performing suppliers might
also, in turn, improve their performance.
Relationship level. We controlled for the pres-
ence of a partnership between an engine supplier
and a team. Race teams that are partners with
their engine suppliers might be able to involve
them more closely than nonpartner teams and
might thus be more likely to perform well. We
also included number of engine failures, mea-
sured as the total number of retirements a team
experienced during a racing season caused by
engine failures. If a race team’s relationship with
its current engine supplier had led to a large
number of engine failures, the team would score
fewer points.
Driver level. We controlled for driver past per-
formance, calculated as the average of the num-
ber of points earned by a team’s two current
drivers in the previous season.
RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 report correlations and summary
statistics for the team-race sample used for engine
modification/redesign models and for the team-
season sample used for product quality models,
respectively.
Table 3 presents the results of the piecewise con-
stant exponential hazard rate estimations of engine
modification/redesign used to test Hypotheses 1
and 2. Model 1 is the baseline with only the control
variables. Some of the significant effects are worth
noting. The negative coefficient for current engine
failures suggests that teams whose engine suppliers
are of lower quality are less likely to receive atten-
tion from their suppliers than are teams with high-
er-quality suppliers. The negative coefficient for
modification/redesign in a previous race suggests
that modified/redesigned engines tend not to be
introduced in every race. At the driver level, driver
past performance increases the hazard rate of
modification/redesign.
Model 2 adds team status, team status advantage,
and team status disadvantage to model 1. It is worth
noting that neither a team’s absolute status nor its
status advantage (or disadvantage) acts to secure
greater effort from the engine suppliers.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 state that team status and
158 FebruaryAcademy of Management Journal
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team status advantage have an effect on effort
when an exchanged product reveals quality prob-
lems, which are captured here as the current
number of engine-related retirements in a racing
season. As this number increases, a team is likely
to benefit from an intervention by the engine
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for the Team-Season Samplea
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Product quality 37.69 47.06
2. Team past performance 37.51 48.19 .86
3. Team size 2.24 1.50 .38 .38
4. Team age 18.08 13.05 .37 .32 .20
5. Team status 5.02 1.00 .04 .01 .03 .04
6. Team status advantage 0.49 0.68 .09 .15 .08 .05 .59
7. Team status disadvantage 0.39 0.69 .08 .16 .08 .02 .44 .41
8. Engine supplier age 63.32 46.95 .06 .18 .03 .01 .13 .15 .02
9. Partnership 0.56 0.50 .50 .43 .02 .31 .06 .01 .16 .11
10. Engine supplier past performance 24.64 46.44 .10 .19 .11 .13 .20 .08 .16 .17 .16
11. Driver past performance 15.53 20.58 .63 .61 .33 .36 .06 .21 .02 .01 .41 .02
12. Number of engine failures 2.86 2.43 .32 .30 .15 .16 .09 .06 .02 .09 .09 .39 .23
13. Supplier effort 0.76 0.81 .53 .52 .17 .26 .02 .05 .19 .21 .25 .37 .33 .31
a n  78. Correlations greater than .22 are significant at p  .05.
TABLE 3
Results of Piecewise Exponential Event History Analysis of Engine Modification/Redesigna
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Team past performance 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Team current performance 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
Team size 0.13 (0.08) 0.12 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09)
Team age 0.02 (0.12) 0.01 (0.13) 0.01 (0.13) 0.01 (0.13)
Team performance, previous race 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Current engine failures 14.86*** (0.59) 14.85*** (0.57) 13.87*** (0.58) 13.61*** (0.55)
Engine supplier age 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Engine supplier past performance 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.03)
Current number of modifications/redesigns 3.17*** (0.34) 3.19*** (0.37) 3.19*** (0.37) 3.19*** (0.37)
Modification/redesign previous race 20.36*** (0.39) 20.37*** (0.39) 19.37*** (0.39) 19.14*** (0.39)
Engine duration 0.03 (0.07) 0.03 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06)
Partnership 0.21 (0.42) 0.14 (0.44) 0.14 (0.44) 0.14 (0.44)
Number of teams supplied 0.09 (0.08) 0.13 (0.08) 0.13 (0.08) 0.13 (0.08)
Driver past performance 0.14* (0.07) 0.16 (0.10) 0.19 (0.10) 0.16 (0.10)
Driver experience 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.02)
Driver duration 0.01 (0.05) 0.04 (0.08) 0.04 (0.07) 0.04 (0.08)
Track length 0.10 (0.10) 0.10 (0.10) 0.13 (0.09) 0.10 (0.10)
Season clock 0.17*** (0.04) 0.16*** (0.04) 0.16*** (0.04) 0.16*** (0.04)
Hazard rate of engine failure 107.69 (72.06) 113.39 (70.49) 113.42 (70.47) 113.37 (70.51)
Team status 0.20 (0.19) 0.63 (0.56) 0.56 (0.67)
Team status advantage 0.30 (0.22) 0.30 (0.22) 1.02 (0.65)
Team status disadvantage 0.06 (0.11) 0.06 (0.11) 1.28 (0.71)
Team status  current engine failures 0.23 (0.33) 0.41 (0.41)
Team status advantage  current engine failures 0.71** (0.30)
Team status disadvantage  current engine failures 0.65* (0.35)
2b 162.29*** 163.55*** 163.55*** 163.55***
df 19 22 23 25
a n  1,250. One-tailed tests for hypothesized effects and two-tailed tests for other variables. Robust standard errors, clustered for race
teams, are in parentheses. Yearly time-pieces are included but not reported.
b Compared to baseline with yearly time-pieces.
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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supplier. Accordingly, we constructed an inter-
action between team current engine failures and
each of the three status variables. Model 3 adds to
model 2 the interaction of team current engine
failures with team status. Though it is in the
predicted direction, the coefficient is not signif-
icant, and thus does not support Hypothesis 1.
Model 4 adds the two interactions of current
engine failures with team status advantage and
team status disadvantage. Supporting Hypothesis
2, the interaction of team current engine failures
with team status advantage has a significant (p 
.01), positive effect, and the interaction of team
status disadvantage with current engine failures
has a significant (p  .05), negative effect. (These
results remain the same if we enter the interac-
tions in pairs in separate models.) Teams experi-
encing quality problems secure greater effort
from their engine suppliers as their status advan-
tage increases. Conversely, teams whose status is
lower than their engine suppliers’ status are less
likely to obtain modifications/redesigns as qual-
ity problems emerge.9
Table 4 presents the results for product quality.
Model 5 is the baseline including only the control
variables, which in this case also comprise the sta-
tus variables. Although the coefficient for team past
performance is positive and significant, team status
advantage has a significant, negative coefficient.
This suggests that working with a lower-status en-
gine supplier reduces product quality. The number
of engine failures is also a significant, negative pre-
dictor suggesting that working with a lower-quality
engine supplier decreases a team’s product quality.
Model 6 adds supplier effort to model 5. Support-
ing Hypothesis 3, the significant (p  .05), positive
effect for supplier effort shows that greater effort, in
the form of a greater number of engine modifica-
tions/redesigns, increases a team’s product quality.
This effect is net of status transfer between part-
ners, as captured by status advantage and disadvan-
tage. It is also worth noting that once we account
for the explicit dimension through which status
advantage benefits a team—in the form of supplier
effort—the negative effect of status advantage is
substantially weaker (17.15, p  .10, vs. 23.09,
p  .05, in model 5).
To test Hypothesis 4, we followed MacKinnon,
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002) and
performed a Sobel (1982) test. This test showed
whether there is an indirect effect of status differ-
ence on product quality through the mediation
variable of supplier effort. The results indicated a
marginally significant mediation effect (z  1.85,
p  .065, two-tailed test), providing weak support
for Hypothesis 4.10 In other words, the negative
effect of team status advantage on product quality
is lessened as a result of the mediation of the sup-
plier effort variable. We believe that the support
9 In the analyses for effort, we collapsed modifications
and redesigns, considering them as identical. To check
whether differences in the effort required by these two
actions might affect our results, we reran all models
defining an event as either modification only or redesign
only. As the results were the same for the two separate
dependent variables, we report only the results for the
collapsed variable.
10 Some scholars (e.g., Shrout & Bolger, 2002) have
proposed using bootstrap analyses for small samples (i.e,
fewer than 80 observations). Although our sample of 78
is close to that cutoff, we nevertheless generated 5,000
bootstrap samples and conducted the mediation analysis
on these samples, using the “sgmediation” command in
Stata 10. This method still yielded marginally significant
support for the mediation effect (z  1.68, p  .09,
two-tailed test).
TABLE 4
Results of Partial Adjustment Models for
Product Qualitya
Variables Model 5 Model 6
Constant 40.49 (60.36) 27.50 (62.56)
 (team past
performance)
0.68*** (0.08) 0.65*** (0.09)
Team size 7.49 (10.56) 7.34 (9.29)
Team age 0.74 (0.80) 0.47 (0.79)
Team status 11.94 (14.03) 8.10 (14.48)
Team status
advantage
23.09* (9.71) 17.15† (9.68)
Team status
disadvantage
13.58 (16.11) 14.42 (14.14)
Engine supplier age 0.20 (0.21) 0.22 (0.18)
Engine supplier past
performance
0.05 (0.21) 0.13 (0.24)
Partnership 52.84† (27.20) 46.13† (25.26)
Number of engine
failures
6.69** (2.38) 5.28** (2.01)
Driver past
performance
0.53 (0.74) 0.44 (0.70)
Supplier effort 17.39* (8.32)
R2 .81 .82
Adjusted R2 .80 .81
a n  78. One-tailed tests for hypothesized effects and two-
tailed tests for other variables. Robust standard errors, clustered
for racing teams, are in parentheses.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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obtained for Hypothesis 4 falls just short of signif-
icance at the .05 level in a two-tailed test because of
our relatively small sample size (n  78).11
The results of model 6 can be interpreted as
follows: If a race team switches from an engine
supplier of equal status to one of lower status,
resulting in an average status advantage ( .49), the
reduction in quality in points is 4.741 ([1.00 
0.65]  [17.15  0.49]). If this switch allows a
team to obtain one engine modification/redesign,
which is the median value for this variable, the
team will increase its quality by 6.087 points
([1.00  0.65]  [17.39  1.00]), for a net gain of
1.346 points. How likely would an F1 team be to
obtain this additional modification/redesign? By
using the coefficients in model 4, we could com-
pute the effect of team status advantage on the rate
of obtaining a modification/redesign for a team that
had experienced an average number of current en-
gine failures (1.87). The multiplier is exp(current
engine failures  team status advantage  0.71) 
exp(1.87  0.49  0.71)  1.917. Thus, an affilia-
tion resulting in an average status advantage in-
creased the hazard rate of obtaining a modification/
redesign by 91.7 percent.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we examined the motivations that
high-status firms have to enter exchange relation-
ships with lower-status partners. We argued that
high-statusfirmscansecuregreatereffortfromlower-
status partners than they can from firms of similar
status. This greater effort should both translate to
higher product quality for a focal firm and mediate
the negative effect incurred by affiliating with a
lower-status partner. Overall, our predictions re-
ceived empirical support. Formula One race teams
were more likely to obtain modified/redesigned en-
gines from their lower-status suppliers as the num-
ber of failed engines increased. In addition, these
interventions increased team quality in terms of
points scored, and they mediated, albeit at mar-
ginal significance, the negative effect of affiliations
with lower-status partners.
We believe this study makes some important
contributions. First and most importantly, it fills a
theoretical gap in the literature on exchange rela-
tionships. Research on status has mainly focused
on the social aspects of exchange relationships
(Podolny, 1994; Stuart, 2000), overlooking the ex-
plicit resource exchanges between firms. As status
is transferred through affiliations (Podolny & Phil-
lips, 1996), authors in this stream of research have
argued that high-status firms prefer to establish ex-
change relationships with firms of similar status to
protect their positions in status hierarchies (Chung,
Singh, & Lee, 2000; Li & Berta, 2002; Podolny,
1993). Nevertheless, this stream of research leaves
unexplained why status-heterophilous relation-
ships may be formed. We extend this perspective
by adding an explicit dimension of exchange,
namely, the effort made by partners, and generate
hypotheses based on the interplay between implicit
status transfer and this explicit dimension. By do-
ing this, we were able to start explaining the exis-
tence of status-heterophilous relationships by de-
riving firms’ motivations for affiliating with those
of lower status.
Second, this study proposes a new measure of
status. This measure is consistent with Merton’s
(1968) formulation, the Matthew effect, and is
based on one of the rewards of status in the indus-
try studied here: how prominent a team is in the
press, net of its performance. If status is measured
using patterns of affiliations, one should ideally
include all relationships a firm has in place. Our
measure of status implicitly takes into account the
effects of all affiliations, because it is based on a
manifestation of the results of affiliations. In addi-
tion, as this measure was extensively validated
with more traditional measures of status based on
affiliations, individual perceptions, and resources
obtained, we believe it to be a good alternative to
these traditional measures of status.
This study also contributes to resource depen-
dence theory. In symbiotic interdependence—
which is typical of customer-supplier relation-
ships—firms try to reduce their dependence by
merging or forming joint ventures (Pfeffer & Novak,
1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). An alternative to
these strategies could be exchanging dependence
for status. If firms can choose among alternative
partners, they can reduce their dependence by af-
filiating with lower-status partners, as status-ho-
11 Arguably, the inclusion in our sample of Ferrari, a
race team that also manufactures its engines, might have
biased our results. To address this concern, we checked
robustness in two ways. First, we dropped Ferrari, the
team, from our sample and ran all analyses on the result-
ing smaller sample (n  1,136 for the event history and
n  71 for the quality and mediation models). All results
relating to our hypotheses were still significant (in some
cases with smaller p-values). Second, we ran the models
including an indicator variable set to 1 if the observation
was for the Ferrari team and 0 otherwise. Again, all
results pertaining to our hypotheses were still significant
(with smaller p-values in some cases). We thus con-
cluded that including Ferrari in our data set did not bias
the results.
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mophilous relationships do not allow a focal firm
to leverage its power position to extract benefits.
This study also has practical implications for
how partnerships are constructed. Before entering
an exchange relationship, a firm should focus on
whether its products are based on standard or novel
designs. Consider the relationship between a com-
puter manufacturer and its suppliers. On the one
hand, a manufacturer such as Dell might be only an
assembler of different modular components that are
integrated into a standard architecture. In this case,
the quality obtained from a similar-status supplier
should be its main concern. On the other hand, a
manufacturer such as Apple might compete by de-
signing a unique architecture based on customized
components. In this case, the manufacturer will
benefit from extra supplier effort in designing and
manufacturing customized components. Here, the
extra effort obtained through status advantage
should be the main concern of the high-status firm.
Our study also has its limitations. Though we
developed our theory by focusing on only one re-
lationship, firms typically have exchange relation-
ships with multiple partners. Thus, high-status
firms pay attention to how the entire portfolio of
their partners, rather than just one relationship,
might affect their status. For instance, they might
enter an exchange relationship with a lower-status
supplier because another exchange relationship
with a high-status partner will compensate for the
resulting loss in status. Future studies should ad-
dress how a firm’s entire portfolio of exchange re-
lationships affects the firm’s affiliation choices and
how these might relate to securing effort from
partners.
Although they were developed in general terms,
we tested our hypotheses on vertical relationships.
It could be argued that these two sets of firms
(customers and suppliers) belong to two different
status arenas, thereby making a comparison of their
status not particularly meaningful. It might be sug-
gested that a better comparison would be obtained
by using horizontal relationships, such as joint ven-
tures or alliances, between firms in the same mar-
ket. Research has suggested that status can be trans-
ferred across related markets (Jensen, 2003),
therefore making status in one social system rele-
vant in other systems, but we acknowledge that a
better test of our theory could be performed on
horizontal relationships.
Other limitations emerge from our empirical con-
text. In Formula One racing, relevant audiences can
easily observe the quality of firms, a situation pos-
sibly producing a tighter coupling between status
and quality than exists in other industries. How-
ever, we found that status transfer still played a role
in how much low-status firms attended to the
needs of their partners. Insofar as status becomes
more relevant as “altercentric” uncertainty in-
creases (Podolny, 2001), the test of our theory in the
current context may well have been a conservative
one. We can speculate that effort from lower-status
partners will be even greater in contexts in which
uncertainty about the quality of firms’ products is
higher. However, as uncertainty increases, firms
prefer to affiliate with firms of similar status
(Podolny, 1994), thereby forfeiting their ability to
extract greater effort from lower-status partners. Fu-
ture studies should explore this tension between
securing greater effort and seeking homophilous
affiliations at different levels of uncertainty.
Moreover, we focused on a type of exchange re-
lationship that race teams need to enter, as cars
cannot race without engines; the alternative is for
teams to make engines themselves. Therefore, our
findings might not apply to those industries in
which firms can choose whether or not to enter an
exchange relationship. For instance, a high-status
retailer such as Whole Foods Market might decide
not to sell a specific product unless it finds a sup-
plier of the desired level of quality, regardless of
the amount of effort the manufacturer would
provide.
Finally, the relatively small numbers of teams
and engine suppliers that competed throughout the
seven years studied here (between 11 and 14 teams
and seven and eight suppliers per year) might sug-
gest a limited market for exchange relationships.
However, a closer look at the industry shows an
active market for exchange relationships between
race teams and engine suppliers. Between 1993 and
1999, 5 teams entered and 10 left F1, and three
suppliers entered and five left, creating an overall
pool of 21 teams and ten engine suppliers. Of 78
team–engine supplier pairs, 34 pairs that were
present in the previous year were disbanded, and
29 were newly created. Although the average num-
ber of teams supplied by an engine supplier per
year is 1.83, in the period we studied there were
three instances of suppliers providing engines to 4
teams, three instances of suppliers providing en-
gines to 3 teams, and ten instances of suppliers
providing engines to 2 teams.
Although some high-status teams might require
exclusive relationships with their suppliers or al-
low their suppliers to provide engines only to low-
status teams (potentially limiting the market for
these suppliers), in the period we studied there
were suppliers providing engines to more than one
high-status team. For instance, Ford supplied en-
gines to the teams ranked 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 7th of
the 13 teams in the status hierarchy in 1995, thus
2010 163Castellucci and Ertug
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supplying 2 high-status teams. In sum, there seems
to exist a market for exchange relationships be-
tween race teams and engine suppliers in F1. All
these figures notwithstanding, F1 racing is still a
relatively small and highly regulated industry. As
teams’ entrance into the industry is regulated by
the FIA, firms can choose from only a relatively
small number of potential exchange partners. Fu-
ture studies should focus on industries in which
the choice of potential exchange partners is greater.
In conclusion, our study illustrates the impor-
tance of contextualizing status transfer with the
material exchange of resources in exchange rela-
tionships. By doing this, it is possible to find firms’
motivations to enter status-heterophilous exchange
relationships. This study therefore represents an
important extension to understanding of why ex-
change relationships are built and the associations
between status transfer and the exchange of re-
sources in these relationships.
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APPENDIX
Estimation of the Hazard Rate of Engine Failure
We used event history techniques (Tuma & Hannan,
1984) to estimate the hazard rate of engine failure. The
details of the models are the same as those of the models
estimating engine modification/redesign described in
“Modeling Strategy.” The dependent variable was time to
an engine failure that resulted in retirement. We created
a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a team had either one
or both cars retired from a race because of engine failure
and 0 otherwise. The time of failure was the date of the
race. Since these were repeated events, we did not re-
move a team from the risk set after engine failures. Our
sample contained 198 engine failures. We provide a brief
description of the additional variables used in the mod-
els reported in Table A1.
Team previous engine failures was the number of a
team’s engine-related retirements in the previous season.
Engine failure, previous race, is the number of cars (zero,
one, or two) that a team retired owing to engine problems
in the previous race. Engine supplier previous engine
failures was the number of engine-related retirements
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experienced by an engine supplier in the previous sea-
son. Driver previous engine failures was the average
number of engine-related retirements the drivers experi-
enced in the previous season. Weather was a dichoto-
mous variable taking the value 1 if there was rain on the
day of the race and 0 otherwise. Number of entrants was
the number of cars on the starting grid for that race.
Team status had a significant, negative effect (p  .05)
on the hazard rate of engine failures, but neither team
status advantage nor team status disadvantage had a sig-
nificant coefficient. These results suggest that the quality
of a team’s engine supplier is driven by the status of the
team and not by its status difference with the supplier.a
a In these analyses the event was a team experiencing
an engine-related retirement of one or both of their cars.
We conducted the same analyses modeling the analysis
at the car-race level, considering engine failures as unor-
dered events. As these analyses yield the same results, we
report only the analyses obtained by collapsing the events.
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TABLE A1
Piecewise Exponential Event History Analysis of Engine Failurea
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Team age .08 (.07) .06 (.05) .04 (.05)
Team past performance .03 (.02) .03* (.01) .04** (.01)
Team size .06 (.09) .07 (.08) .04 (.08)
Team current performance .01 (.00) .00 (.00) .01 (.00)
Engine supplier age .02 (.01) .03** (.01) .02* (.01)
Engine supplier past performance .10*** (.02) .12*** (.02) .12*** (.02)
Number of teams supplied .01 (.06) .04 (.05) .05 (.07)
Partnership .05 (.18) .02 (.18) .01 (.18)
Engine duration .03 (.04) .03 (.03) .02 (.03)
Driver past performance .13* (.06) .11 (.06) .11 (.06)
Driver experience .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Driver duration .01 (.05) .01 (.05) .03 (.05)
Track length .02 (.10) .02 (.10) .02 (.10)
Number of entrants .14 (.09) .14 (.09) .13 (.09)
Weather .62* (.26) .62* (.26) .61* (.26)
Current engine failures .04 (.03) .04 (.03) .05* (.03)
Engine failure previous race .31 (.19) .29 (.19) .30 (.19)
Engine supplier previous engine failures .00 (.02) .00 (.01) .00 (.02)
Team previous engine failures .00 (.04) .02 (.03) .00 (.04)
Driver previous engine failures .04 (.03) .06* (.03) .06* (.03)
Season clock .07*** (.01) .07*** (.01) .07*** (.01)
Team status .21* (.11) .27* (.11)
Team status advantage .26 (.15)
Team status disadvantage .13 (.14)
2b 107.9*** 112.66*** 114.87***
df 21 22 24
a n  1,250.
b Compared to baseline with yearly time-pieces. Two-tailed tests for all variables. Robust standard errors, clustered for racing teams, are
in parentheses. Yearly time-piece effects are included but not reported.
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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